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THE LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITY COMBINATION POLICY
In 1941 when the Supreme Court decided Helvering v. LeGierse the
taxation of the life insurance and annuity combination policy was thought
to be settled in the Government's favor. However, after Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Sinitl2 the road again appeared open to obtain
substantial tax savings by using the life insurance and annuity combina-
tion policy. In an effort to clarify the Government's position in the area,
Revenue Rulings 65-57 and 65-69' were issued last year. These rulings
invite an examination of the life insurance and annuity combination
policy.
In Helvering v. LeGierse4 the decedent, at the age of eighty, entered
into two contracts with an insurance company less &-an one month before
her death. The first of these was an annuity contract which provided for
the payment of $589.80 annually for life to the decedent at a cost of
$4,179. The second contract was a single premium life insurance policy
with a premium of $22,946 which provided for the payment of $25,000
upon her death. Decedent retained both policies until her death. Deced-
ent was not required to pass a physical examination." It was found that
the insurance contract would not have been issued without the annuity
contract.' Considering both contracts together, it is clear that the insur-
ance company would merely be paying interest on the single premium pay-
ment in the form of an annuity and, upon the death of the insured, would
pay the principal to the named beneficiary.7 The Court held that, con-
sidering both contracts together, there was lacking the element of "risk"
commonly and historically involved in insurance. In defining amounts
receivable as insurance, the Court held that "the amounts must be received
as the result of a transaction which involved an actual 'insurance risk' at
1. 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
2. 356 U.S. 274 (1958).
3. 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 56 and 440.
4. 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
5. The Board of Tax Appeals found that although no physical examination was
required, she was "in good health for one of her years and had a life expectancy of be-
tween four and five years." 39 B.T.A. 1134, 1140 (1939).
6. The reason that the insurance would not have been issued without the annuity
was because decedent's advanced age involved a much more di;ficult task of underwrit-
ing. In this case the rate charged was one which was actuarially 'based on the rates
charged people of other ages and not based on the premium that would normally have
been charged a person of her age. 39 B.T.A. 1134, 1138-39 (139). However, it is sig-
nificant that the insurer did not ordinarily issue single premium ordinary life insurance
to persons over 70 years of age without a physical examination.
7. See Commissioner v. Keller, 113 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 543
(1940) for a step-by-step analysis of this contention.
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the time the transaction was executed." 8  Thus, this was not life insur-
ance and the $25,000 proceeds were includible in decedent's gross estate
"as a transfer to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death."9  The Court made no mention of income tax consequences for
there probably were none, either because the proceeds were excludible as
a gift, bequest, or devise,1" or possibly as proceeds of life insurance."
This suggested that the definition of life insurance for income tax pur-
poses is different than for estate tax purposes.
In Fidelity-Philadelphia Trwst Co. v. Smith, 2 the Supreme Court
was faced with a similar annuity-insurance combination, with one signifi-
cant difference: the decedent insured had irrevocably assigned the insur-
ance policies to the beneficiaries more than three years prior to her death
and had paid a gift tax on the transfer.' Both parties agreed that the
inclusion of the proceeds in gross estate was not determined by the life
insurance provisions. 4 The Commissioner sought to include the proceeds
in the estate as a transfer with a retained life estate, i.e., the annuity.'"
The Court, in finding the proceeds non-includible in gross estate, stated:
"The use and enjoyment of the annuity policies were entirely independent
of the life insurance policies. Because of this independence, the Commis-
sioner may not by aggregating the two types of policies into one invest-
ment, conclude that by receiving the annuities, the decedent had retained
income from the life insurance contracts."' 6
Fidelity-Philadelphia raised no income tax issues," but the Court
did refer, with apparent approval, to several lower court cases which
had subjected the annuity portion of the combination to income tax
but only on the portion of the aggregate premium which had been allo-
cated to the annuity.' The Commissioner has recently ruled that in the
future the proceeds of the "insurance" policy in such a combination will
8. 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941).
9. 312 U.S. 531, 542 (1941), citing the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(c), 44
Stat. 70, then the Int. Rev. Code of 1939 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2035, 2036,
2037).
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b) (3) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102).
11. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b) (1) (now INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, § 101).
12. 356 U.S. 274 (1958).
13. The possibility of inclusion under § 811 (1) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939 as a
gift in contemplation of death was thus avoided.
14. 356 U.S. 274, 277 (1958).
15. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c) (1) (B).
16. 356 U.S. 274, 281 (1958). The Court apparently was impressed by the fact
that receipt of the annuities was not conditioned upon the continued existence of the life
insurance policies, and that the life insurance policies could be surrendered. Id. at 280.
17. No mention was made in the text of the opinion of any income tax consequences.
18. 356 U.S. 274, 281 n. 9 (1958), citing Commissioner v. Meyer, 139 F.2d 256
(6th Cir. 1943) ; Helvering v. Meredith, 140 F2d 973 (8th Cir. 1944) ; John Koehrer,
4 T.C.M. 219 (1945).
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not be excluded from gross income as life insurance but will be subject
to icome tax to the extent they exceed the net premium paid for that con-
tract."0  This excess will not be subject to capital gain treatment.20
Unfortunately the income, gift, and estate tax consequences in this
area are not quite as clear as one might be led to believe. The Commis-
sioner has stated that LeGierse was not overruled by Fidelity-Philadelphia,
but rather is distinguishable from it.2 The Commissioner attempts to
reconcile the decisions by explaining that in LeGierse the concept of "in-
surance" was held to require an actual insurance risk "'at the time the
transaction was executed," whereas Fidelity-Philadelphia only decided
that the contracts, once issued, were so separable that one could be dis-
posed of independently of the other. The Commissioner then concludes
that Fidelity-Philadelphia is consistent with the view that, even after is-
sue, the contract lacked the element of risk inherent in insurance and
thus was not insurance. This distinction is justified by the fact that both
parties in Fidelity-Philadelphia conceded that there was no insurance and
therefore the requirement in LeGierse that there be an insurance element
at the time the transaction is executed, regardless of subsequent assign-
ment, remains viable. The petitioner in Fidelity-Philadelphia had no rea-
son to argue the point. Because of the assignment of the insurance pol-
icy, whether or not it was "insurance" would have rio effect on its inclu-
sion in gross estate. It would appear under this reasoning that Fidelity-
Philadelphia is of no real aid in determining whether an insurance-annuity
combination contains an insurance element.
However, in considering the policies separable and individual items
of property in Fidelity-Philadelphia the Court may have impliedly, and
perhaps unintentionally, determined the life insurance argument. If the
policies are to be considered separately for section 2036 purposes, it
seems reasonable to consider separately the risks borne by each party on
each policy. If this separability was intended by the Court to apply in all
insurance-annuity combination situations, and not only where the issue
raised was whether this was a transfer with a retained life estate, the
insurance policy would then necessarily be considered in relation to its
19. Rev. Rul. 65-57, 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 56. In the fact situation on which this
ruling was based, the "insurance policy" had been assigned to the beneficiary by gift.
20. Bodine v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
576 (1939). This case involved a combination life annuity and life insurance policy
which was surrendered prior to maturity. There was found to be no sale or exchange
and this would hold true even if the policy were held to maturty. But see J. J. Rhein-
gold, 10 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 41, 319 (1941), in which capital gain treatment was allowed,
but in which there was a clear sale of the policy by the beneficiary to a third person and
a sale back to the beneficiary's conservators.
21. Rev. Rul. 65-57, 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 56, 58.
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proportionate share of the total premium. The Court held that the an-
nuity policy could be viewed as independent of and not contingent upon
the existence of the life insurance policy. If the premiums on the policies
may be considered separable, from the perspective of estate tax treatment,
at least in the assigned insurance policy situation, the policies must be
considered separable, and, as such, there is an insurance risk as defined
in LeGierse.
Another argument for the proposition that there is a life insurance
element in an insurance-annuity combination is based upon the Court's
reference in Fidelity-Philadelphia,2 with apparent approval, to the income
tax treatment of such combinations in Commissioner v. Meyer,23 Edna E.
Meredith,"4 and John Koehrer.25 In these cases the aggregate premium
was apportioned for income tax purposes between the two policies. There-
fore, a portion of the aggregate premium could be attributed to the life
insurance policy. This is inferentially conceded by the Commissioner in
Revenue Ruling 65-57,26 which refers to the excess of the proceeds over
the "net premiums paid for the contract." Again, there would be an
element of risk because the "net premium paid for the contract" is less
than the death benefit. This can only be termed as a method of risk-
shifting or risk-distributing and that policy must, therefore, be considered
life insurance as defined by the Supreme Court." Thus, when viewed
from the perspective of income tax treatment of an insurance-annuity
combination, the policies can be considered separately and the risk ele-
ment inherent in all insurance contracts under the LeGierse formulation
is present in the insurance portion of the combination.
However, if Fidelity-Philadelphia is read narrowly, the LeGierse
formulation retains vitality and there is still no insurance element in the
combination. The narrow reading relies upon the fact that although the
annuity policy is independent of the insurance policy, the insurance policy
is dependent upon the annuity. This is true because the annuity policy
cannot be surrendered without also surrendering the insurance policy.
This is the interpretation given the decision by the Commissioner in is-
suing Revenue Ruling 65-57. The Commissioner contends that the
Court's decision should not be taken to mean that the policies are never
to be considered inseparable. Because the annuity policy could not have
been surrendered without also surrendering the "insurance" policy, the
22. 356 U.S. 274, 281 n. 9 (1958).
23. 139 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1943).
24. 1 T.C.M. 846, aff'd, Helvering v. Meredith, 140 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1944).
25. 4 T.C.M. 219 (1945).
26. 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 56.
27. See Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
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policies were inseparable in that sense and the Court could have considered
them as such, but did not. The decision itself settles the question of
separability when the issue is retained life estate and it is submitted that
the combination should retain the same character even if the issue is
life insurance, as in LeGierse. This conclusion would be reinforced by
the actual issuance, or the possibility of issuance, of the policies in dif-
ferent names, i.e., direct issuance of the insurance portion to the benefi-
ciary rather than by subsequent assignment. The Commissioner's ex-
planation based on the "once issued" distinction in Revenue Ruling 65-57
is inadequate and his "no insurance" argument would fall because, under
the Commissioner's reasoning, there is nothing on -x hich to join the con-
tracts "at issue," or "at the time the transaction was executed." On the
other hand, the economic realities have not changed at all. The "insur-
ance" policy is still dependent upon the annuity contract.
The entire argument could be rendered moot if the insurance-annuity
combination is attacked under section 2039. Both LeGierse and Fidelity-
Philadelphia were decided prior to the 1954 Code when there was no pro-
vision analogous to section 2039. Section 2039 inacludes in the gross
estate the value of any payment receivable by a beneficiary by reason of
surviving the decedent under any contract except a li e insurance contract,
under which a payment was payable to the decedent for his life or for a
period not ascertainable without reference to his death. The insurance-
annuity combination apparently fits this description except that Fidelity-
Philadelphia held that the Commissioner could not aggregate the two
contracts into one, and section 2039 ostensibly refers, to a single contract.
This section would govern the combination policy in a LeGierse situation
where, without subsequent transfer of the "insurance" contract, the poli-
cies are not considered separable. However, the separability issue would
still have to be faced in a Fidelity-Philadelphia situation. More impor-
tant, there is the possibility that even though the contracts have been
separated by the transfer to the insurance policy, as in Fidelity-
Philadelphia, an overriding contract or agreement which encompassed
both contracts might be found to exist which would fall within the con-
tract or agreement required by section 2039.2" In that case, the Court
might find that this was neither an annuity nor a life insurance policy,
but rather an interest contract" which could be includible in gross estate
28. See Treas. Regs. § 20.2039-1(b) (1) (ii) defining "contract or agreement." In
the case of contracts set up by an employer, the regulations specifically refer to "any
combination of arrangements, understandings or plans." Ibid. See also example (6) at
Treas. Regs. § 20.2039-1(b) (2).
29. An interest contract as opposed to an annuity does not return to the purchaser
any amount of the original investment in addition to the intere3t earned. Commissioner
v. Meyer, 139 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1943).
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as an "other payment" under section 2039. The whole payment would
have to be considered in these circumstances as a gift."0 As such, there
would be no income tax consequences to the beneficiary." Despite eco-
nomic realities, this line of argument is probably too strained to gain
acceptance.
PRESENT INCOME TAXATION OF THE ANNUITY-INSURANCE
COMBINATION
Prior to Revenue Ruling 65-57,"2 the annuity-insurance combination
provided an outstanding device for tax savings. Not only did the tax-
payer secure the tax advantages of an ordinary purchase of an annuity,
but he could also transfer by gift the insurance portion of the combina-
tion and thus favor the objects of his bounty without incurring estate
tax on the transfer under Fidelity-Philadelphia.3 The Commissioner has
ruled, however, that, in the future, the appreciation in value of the insur-
ance policy over the cost of the policy will be subject to income taxation.34
Gift tax would be incurred on the transfer of the "insurance" policy, but
the Commissioner has publicly accepted Fidelity-Philadelphia on the is-
sues actually litigated there and ruled that the proceeds will not be included
in gross estate as a transfer with a retained life estate.3"
Tax savings for fairly large estates entering into a Fidelity-
Philadelphia situation where the beneficiary's income tax rate is also high
is not surprising.8 However, the tax saving still holds true for estates
30. If the contracts were joinable for the purpose of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §
2039 and the value of the payment determined at the time of death of the decedent, surely
the Court would have to overlook any "vested" interest in the policy prior to death, at
least for purposes of measuring the amount of gift.
31. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a).
32. 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 56.
33. Even though there is a possibility that the gift would be included in his gross
estate by virtue of INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 2035 as a gift in contemplation of death, in
no event will he be worse off because of the estate tax credit for gift tax paid unless the
limitations are exceeded. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2012.
34. Rev. Rul. 65-57, 1965-1 Cum. BuuL. 56.
35. Rev. Rul. 65-69, 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 440.
36. As an example, assume a $1,000,000 taxable estate including the insurance for
a 65 year old widower, an only son filing a joint return with other taxable income of
$44,000 (50% bracket) and a combination policy with a face amount of $100,000. The
premium on the insurance would be $75,400. If the insurance policy is given to the son
and the proceeds are only subjected to estate tax, the total tax would be as follows, as-
suming all gift exemptions have been previously used and there have been no previous
taxable gifts. The gift tax would be $10,359 as a taxable gift of $75,400 would be made
since this is the amount the insurance company would charge for a single premium con-
tract of $100,000 on the life of a person of the age of the father. The net additional tax
because of inclusion in the estate would be $26,641 ($100,000 at 37% less gift tax credit
of $10,359). The son would receive $73,359 at a cost to his father of $85,759. If the
insurance proceeds were only subjected to income tax on the son and not to estate tax,
the total tax, assuming all gift exemptions have been previously used, would be as fol-
lows. The gift tax would again be $10,359. There would be no estate tax, but the son
730
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of more modest valuations.3" The reason for this is that the effective
tax rate on the proceeds when included in the estate is the highest tax
rate for that size estate and the rate is on the whole face amount of the
insurance. On the other hand, if the insurance is not included in the
estate and only gift and income taxes are levied, the tax impact is nor-
mally less because the gift tax is at the rate assessed for the amount of
the gift and not the whole estate and the income tax, although at a high
percentage, is levied only on the appreciation in value of the policy."
Revenue Ruling 65-57 necessarily assumes that the premium paid
for the insurance-annuity combination will be apportioned to determine
the gain for income tax purposes. This apportionment is the greatest
single variant in the computation of the tax savings obtained through a
combination purchase. As the premium apportioned to the insurance
policy decreases, the amount of the death benefit which is subject to in-
come tax increases, and vice versa. Thus, the older the insured when the
policies are issued, the greater the income tax savings which will be ef-
fected under the present ruling. 9
In conclusion, annuities and life insurance policies can be useful and
economical tools in tax planning. However, as with all valuable tools,
their usefulness is entirely dependent upon their usc in a proper manner
by a skillful person. If incorrectly used, the result is likely to be less
than desirable.
would pay income tax on $24,600 ($100,000 policy less premitn of $75,400). His tax-
able income would become $68,600 subjecting him to a tax of $26,950, or $12,890 more
because of the inclusion in his taxable income of the insurance amount. Under these
circumstances the son receives $87,110 at a cost to his father of $85,759, so that there is
a net gain here of $13,751 ($87,110 - $73,359) over the othtr method. Although the
estate tax is only 37% and the income tax rate is 50-55%, the estate tax rate is on the
whole amount of the proceeds whereas the income tax rate is on only the excess of the
proceeds over the premium.
37. In the event that the taxable estate was of the more modest amount of $250,000
including the insurance, the son in this situation would still rec,-ive considerably more by
paying income tax on the excess instead of including it in his father's estate. If in-
cluded in the estate the son would receive $70,000 at a cost to his father of $85,759,
whereas if it was only subjected to income tax he would receive again $87,110.
38. In the example above the estate tax is 37% of $100,000, but the gift tax is at
various rates with the maximum being 21% on $75,400 and the income tax rate of 50-
55% being on only $24,600. Notice too that when the taxablt estate was decreased to
a quarter of its size, the amount which the son received throu2 h including the insurance
in the estate increased by only $7,000.
39. In LeGierse the insured was 80 and the apportioned p,-emium was roughly 92%
of the face amount of the policy, thus income tax would have been levied only on 8%
of the face amount.
